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Affirmative Action as a Strategy of Justice
T
~e problem that affinna~ve.action seeks to remedy
is a structural one. For Its first hundred years, this
country embraced a slave system defined in racial
terms; for its next hundred, the country's caste struc-
ture was maintained by a strict system of segregation
known as Jim Crow.
In 1954, a clarion call went out from, of all places, the
Supreme Court and we began the long, painful process
of structural reform. Many institutions and agencies
participated in that process, fashioning and imple-
menting a wide variety of remedies. Having its roots
in the late 1960s, affirmative action emerged as one
such strategy.
At first, affirmative action contemplated a certain
measure of color consciousness in the recruitment
process. Blacks were specifically invited to apply for
positions that traditionally had been reserved for
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whites. They were told that the doors were now open.
Soon, however, the strategy took on a different and
sharper meaning, that of preferential treatment.. In the
process of allocating scarce opportunities, blacks were
to be given a "plus" in the evaluation of their candida-
cies in the hope that it would enable them to obtain a
larger portion of these prized positions.
Many justifications have been offered for this plus.
Some see affinnative action as a way of diversifying
life in the public square, of creating a broad variety of
viewpoints in, for example, the institutions of higher
learning. Under this view, affinnative action is neces-
sary to remedy the deleterious effects of segregation
that are felt by whites as well as blacks: a certain cul-
tural isolation or insularity. Others see affirmative
action as an exercise of compensatory justice. It is an
effort to rectify the wrongs of the past by giving blacks
an additional advantage-the plus-in the allocative
process. I find both these justifications wanting.
The diversity rationale seems shallow, for it lacks the
normative pull necessary to justify the costs inevitably
entailed in a system of preferential treatment. The
rationale has little appeal once we move outside the
university context, for example, to the realm of pro-
duction workers or guardrail contractors. Even in the
university context, diversity seems an incomplete justi-
fication. Standing alone, the rationale lacks a standard
or basis for choosing what kinds of diversity we
should favor, why, for example, we should give a plus
to blacks but not to members of religious minorities.
The compensatory justice rationale has the norma-
tive pull so lacking with diversity, but falters because
of the lack of identity between the victims of the
wrong'and the recipients of the preferential treatment,
and between the perpetrators of the wrong and those
who bear the cost of the remedy. The rationale also
leaves unexplained why a plus in the allocative
process, and thus an increase in the share of the prized
positions of society, is the appropriate compensation
for the wrongs of the past.
These two defenses of affinnative action-diversity
and compensatory justice-emerged in the fierce
struggles of the 19705 and are standard today, but I see
them as simply rationalizations created to appeal to
the broadest constituency. They proved to be easy tar-
gets for the Hopwood court. I sharply disagree with the
conclusion of that court, however, because I think of
affirmative action in other terms. In my opinion, affir-
mative action should be seen as a means that seeks to
eradicate caste structure by altering the social standing
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of our country's most subordinated group. By giving
members of that subordinated group a greater share of
the prized positions of society, we improve the relative
position of that group and, in so doing, make a small
but determined contribution to eliminating the caste
structure. The social ordering of racial groups is
altered.
The structural justification, like the compensation
theory, constitutes a theory of justice. In a caste system,
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not only are socially groups hierarchically ordered, but
membership in a group is determined on the basis of
ascriptive criteria and one's presence in the subordi-
nated group places a ceiling on his or her opportuni-
ties and life chances. The imperative for eradicating
such a social structure may be an expression of a com-
munity's self-understanding and aversion to the kind
of society that is divided and ordered by caste.
Alternatively, the imperative for reform may be based
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on individualistic concerns; eliminating caste may be
seen as an essential precondition for the self-
actualization of the individuals who form the subordi-
nated group.
Like the theory of compensatory justice, the struc-
tural rationale builds on history, only it does so in a
different way. In the compensatory theory, history
counts as a normative reason, whereas in the hands of
the structuralist, history is solely factual. Slavery and
Jim Crow are not the reasons for the remedy, but
instead provide the particular causal dynamic that
produced the social structure that needs to be reme-
died. Affirmative action is concerned with the present,
with eliminating any form of caste that exists in the
here and now. It seeks to rem~dy not wrongs of the
past, but the intolerable situation that this country
finds itself in today. As such, the strategy would
extend not just to blacks, but to any group currently
subordinated in society. For example, immigrants who
only recently arrived in this country and did not suffer
past wrongs at the hands of American society would
be eligible for affirmative action if, in the strategy's
absence, such immigrants would constitute a subordi-
nated group.
Although I believe that affirmative action should be
seen as a strategy of justice, though more a means of
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distributive, rather than corrective, justice, I acknowl-
edge that this strategy undeniably works its own
wrongs. For blacks who obtain the prized positions, a
doubt is created in the minds of some, including the
prizewinners themselves, as to whether they would be
where they are without preferences. For rejected white
applicants, there is the frustration of desire, of not
being able to attend particular schools or to obtain spe-
cific jobs. In addition, these applicants suffer a hurt that
blacks know all too well-the hurt that comes from
being judged disfavorably on a criterion unrelated to
individual merit and over which they have no control.
These grievances are indeed genuine; they are
wrongs never to be forgotten and never to be trivial-
ized. We should not conclude, however, that by identi-
fying or locating these wrongs, we have provided a
sufficient reason to enjoin or dismiss a remedial pro-
gram with purposes as transcendent as those of affir-
mative action. In an imperfect world, a great transfor-
mation cannot be achieved without pain and sacrifice,
without even a measure of injustice. Surely, this must
be the great lesson of the Civil War.
Asking for such sacrifices is an extraordinary, but
appropriate, request, provided that two conditions are
satisfied. One is that the cause involved is so noble and
so worthy as to justify the individual suffering that it
inflicts. The other is that there is no other way. To sup-
port affirmative action despite its harms we must
believe, as Justice Blackmun once put it, that we can-
not mitigate or eradicate caste without this system of
preferences-that, ultimately, we cannot get beyond
racism without taking race into account.
-Owen M. Fiss
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